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I 
Gassendi, who was influenced in the development 
ofhis moral theory by Epicurus,2 was, as was Epicurus, 
a vegetarian. Gassendi argues, in his Philosophiae 
Epicuri Syntagma,3 his reconstruction of Epicurus' 
theory, and in his Syntagma Philosophicum,4 presenting 
his own ethics, that abstaining from flesh is a moral 
requirement, i.e., a requirement for "doing well."5 
Further, Gassendi represents, as an Epicurean position, 
the view that rights and the obligations attendant upon 
rights pertain only to those bound together by a social 
contract, and, agreements with animals being infeasible, 
we have no obligations which follow from their rights. 
Why and how, then, is vegetarianism a moral 
requirement? In what follows, I will examine a 
Gassendist response to this question to ascertain how 
vegetarianism can be supported in the context of a 
Gassendist moral theory. 
Bernier's Abrege de la Philosophie de Gassendi 
(Lyons, 1684), which is an abridgement and translation 
into French of Gassendi's lengthy Latin Syntagma 
Philosophicum, served to popularize Gassendi's views. 
Bernier provides a reasonably faithful rendition of 
Gassendi's views. It is Bernier's text that is translated 
into English in Three Discourses ofHappiness, Virtue 
and Liberty, a 1699 publication on moral philosophy 
that is attributed to Gassendi.6 To better comprehend 
the views of Gassendi as understood by seventeenth-
century Gassendists, in what follows, English 
translations of passages presenting Gassendi's view 
will, where possible, be.taken from Three Discourses 
on Happiness, Virtue and Liberty.? Likewise, English 
translations of passages from Gassendi 's representation 
ofEpicurus' view will be taken from Thomas Stanley's 
translation of Gassendi's Philosophiae Epicuri 
Syntagma. 8 
In the context of Gassendi's virtue ethics, in which 
he defmes moral philosophy as "the art of doing well" 
[TD, 2],9 Gassendi discusses the fundamental virtues 
of temperance, fortitude, justice, and prudence, with 
happiness as the summum bonum. Vegetarianism is said 
to be a requirement of sobriety, a virtue of temperance. 
He explains: 
It is therefore an undeniable truth, that 
happiness, or a life free from pain and misery, 
are such things as influence all our actions and 
purposes to the obtaining of them. [TD, 1] 
Following Epicurus, Gassendi identifies happiness 
with pleasure, and pleasure, he claims, is to be correctly 
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analyzed as the "relief from" or "absence of' pain or 
misery. [G, 2.415] Pain, from this viewpoint. is apriori 
undesirable and, in itself, bad. The good, as pleasure, 
is measured by the extent to which an action retains an 
absence of pain or relieves pain without producing 
additional pains. 
Gassendi's moral theory, then, can be said to involve 
the following principle, which I shall refer to as "the 
principle ofleast pain": "Living well" consists in doing 
that which will be most effective in minimizing pain in 
one's own body and mind. Though pleasure associated 
with excessive and sumptuous eating satisfies hunger, 
unlike moderate eating, it bears with itself pains, and 
hence, this action is not a good. Sobriety is essential to 
living well. 
In regard to diet, the following principle is required 
to satisfy the principle ofleastpain: Act only on desires 
for that which is both natural and necessary. That which 
is both natural and necessary, we are told, will relieve 
hunger and its associated pains without producing new 
pains; but a variety of discomforts follow from the 
consumption of that which is unnecessary or unnatural, 
and, hence, these should be avoided. Further, Gassendi 
contends in support of his vegetarianism, the 
consumption of flesh is neither natural nor necessary 
for human beings. What he means by "necessary" and 
"natural" requires clarification. 
That which is necessary, according to Gassendi, is 
the minimum required, in quantity and effort. to maintain 
one's health and well-being. He argues (YD, 147ff.]: 
1. Very little is required to satisfy basic needs 
and to maintain a healthy body, and these 
needs can be satisfied with little effort, and, 
hence, without pain. 
2. Excesses, beyond what is physically necessary 
to maintain the body, can produce various 
sorts of pains, and such luxuries are often 
difficult to obtain. 
3. Therefore the best way to avoid pain is to 
avoid the desire for excesses and to be content 
with a little. 
Being content with a little, he contends, is the most 
effective way to satisfy the principle of least pain; the 
way to avoid pain and suffering is not by striving to 
acquire more, but rather by desiring less. 
Between the Species. 
Gassendi represents this as Epicurus' view: 
To accustom ourselves to a simple diet brings 
and preserves health. For it is sumptuous 
feasting and variety of meats which [causes] 
head-aches, rheums, gouts, fevers and other 
diseases; not plain and simple food. (SPE, 917] 
Further, desiring the minimum required to maintain 
one's health and well-being "renders us fearless of 
fortune" for: 
[H]e, who is content with coarse food, as fruits 
and salads, who is satisfied with bread and 
water, who has confined his desire with these, 
what can he fear from Fortune? For, who is 
there so poor as to want these? Who so 
distressed that he cannot easily meet with 
beans, pulse, herbs, fruits? As for water, what 
need I mention it? [SPE, 918] 
A simple diet, simple in its substance and in its 
accessibility, contributes to a state of equilibrium of 
mind and body, which, if established, allows for 
activities which are satisfying in themselves, such as 
the experience of pure pleasures, e.g., of philosophy 
and of music, which are free of pain. 
To demonstrate that flesh is not necessary for the 
health of human beings, Gassendi concurs with the 
Epicurean claim that "the eating of flesh is less to be 
approved, as being rather prejudicial to health than 
wholesome" [SPE, 918] because: 
[H]ealth is preserved by the same means 
whereby it is recovered; but it is manifest that 
it is recovered by a thin diet and abstinence 
fromflesh. [SPE,918] . 
Ifhealth can be recovered, indeed is best recovered, by 
means ofa diet thatcontains no flesh, then, it is argued, 
health can also be preserved without eating flesh, so 
flesh foods are not necessary for human health. As 
such, eating flesh is an excess, and, like other excesses, 
it is an indulgence that can cause pain. Further, it is 
assumed that flesh foods are more difficult to obtain 
and to prepare than "fruits and salads," "bread and 
water"; in desiring flesh, then, we become more subject 
to the difficulties associated with seeking to obtain 
such foods. 
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It might be objected that Gassendi's assumptions 
are overhasty. Consider the following society of the 
isolated and unknown island Isla; encircled and cut 
off from the sea by huge rocky cliffs. On Isla the soil 
is such that no trees and no crops other than grass will 
grow. How Isla came to be inhabited is not our 
problem here, but on Isla there are, in fact, many 
animals who eat the grass as well as others, including 
humans, who prey on these. The human inhabitants of 
Isla find it easy to obtain flesh foods and to prepare 
these in simple ways, easier than their counterparts 
elsewhere find the obtaining of ingredients for and the 
preparation ofbread. Finally, they have found it helpful, 
when ill, to imbibe certain boiled meats or a clear meat 
broth. Gassendi's arguments for vegetarianism would 
support the eating of flesh on Isla. Therefore, it would 
seem, his arguments support not vegetarianism as such, 
but rather a spare and simply prepared diet of whatever 
nutritious foods are readily available. 
Gassendi, though, would reject this result, because 
he would claim that the inhabitants of our hypothetical 
island Isla are in a hardship situation that conflicts 
with what is natural for human beings. He claims: 
The best and only remedy to pass our lives free 
and void of trouble, is to suit ourselves to nature, 
to desire nothing but what itrequires.... [ID, 18] 
and 
[A]ccording to our natural inclination, we 
must love these things and make them the end 
of that chief happiness, which consists in the 
acquisition of such things as are according to 
nature. [TD, 143-144] 
Gassendi, unlike Epicurus, maintains that God's 
providence justifies our trust in the guidance of nature, 
for God has artfully arranged his creation so that 
creatures naturally desire their own good, and are guided 
by their natural experience ofpleasure and pain in their 
pursuit of that good. 
The whole ofGassendi's moral philosophy, in which 
the moral is identified with the natural, is unified by 
his account of divine providence. 
The Designer of Nature...seasoned all actions 
with the spice of pleasure; and willed the 
greatest pleasures for those future acts that are 
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most necessary for the preservation of either 
an entire genus or for the preservation of 
individual animals. [G,2.701] 
From this viewpoint, what is moral and what is natural 
. coincide, because God, as the designer of nature, is 
the cause of the natural inclinations and aversions, and 
the pleasures and pains, which combine to constitute our 
affections and to influence our actions. The natural is 
that which is in accordance with the divine plan; doing 
with a little is natural for human beings because a diet 
of only that which is necessary for health is what, in 
fact, in God's plan, is most conducive to human well-
being. Nothing natural to us, i.e., nothing necessary for 
our well-being, can cause us pain. Pain is God's means 
of guiding us to avoid that which is harmful to us, that 
which is not natural for humans beings in the divine 
design. As Such, acting so as to avoid pain is a moral 
requirement, respecting God's will. 
For Gassendi, then, the natural, in regard to diet, 
includes all that humans can consume without ill 
effect, in accordance with the divine plan. The 
necessary is a subclass of the natural, and consists in 
the minimum, chosen from what is natural to human 
beings, that is required to maintain human health. 
Gassendi tells us that "Flesh seems to be no natural 
food for human beings." [TD, 288] According to 
Gassendi, eating flesh is not necessary for human well-
being, it is not a proper element in a minimal human 
diet, because it is not natural for human beings-it 
violates the divine plan and hence can be detrimental 
to human health and can cause pain. 
In a letter to Van Helmont written in 1729, Gassendi 
rejects Van Helmont's claim that meat is a natural food 
for human beings. He says: 
From the formation ofour teeth, it can be seen 
that we are not prepared by nature to be flesh-
eating animals. To animals, such as lions, 
tigers, bears, dogs, cats, and others, which 
nature prepared for this nourishment, she 
gave long, pointed, sharp, separated, unequal 
teeth. On the contrary, to those that should 
eat herbs and fruits, nature gave teeth that 
are short, wide, obtuse, contiguous and 
disposed in a single series, as one can notice 
in horses, cows, sheep, deer and other 
creatures. Now the teeth of men are not like 
those of the former genus, but of this latter. 
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Therefore, it is probable nature wishes us to 
be nourished not on meat as the prior, but on 
fruits as the posterior.10 
Gassendi further maintains that flesh is too succulent 
for our bodies, and eating flesh foods overburdens the 
stomach, impedes digestion, and causes illness. He 
explains that meat must be digested wholly in the 
stomach rather than in the mouth; the body is over-
whelmed by this substance. Nourishment by fruits does 
not produce this kind ofeffect. On the contrary, Gassendi 
tells us, fruits are a light nourishment. As such, they do 
not overburden the stomach, they are easily digested, 
and they form a chyle sufficient for our nourishment. 
That humans are by nature vegetarians is, for Gassendi, 
evident in the physical structure of our teeth and in our 
physiological reactions to what is eaten, and, in this, 
for Gassendi, God's will and guidance to us is clear. 
Further, it is his view that what is natural and what is 
moral coincide, and, therefore, it is imperative to act in 
accordance with our nature, i.e. with God's will. 
Yet there can be a conflict ofvalues in obeying God's 
will, and this is the case for the inhabitants of Isla. As 
religious Jews during the holocaust found it the lesser 
ofevils to eat unkosher foods rather than starve, so too 
the human beings on Isla, in effect, in a lifeboat 
situation, are justified in eating flesh, but as a lesser of 
evils, for the sake of survival. 
Gassendi explains: 
[T]he f"rrst inclination thatNature has bestowed 
on us is self-preservation; that we may 
preserve ourselves such as we ought to be; that 
we are men made up of soul and body; and 
therefore according to our natural inclination, 
we must love these things, and make them the 
end of that chief happiness which consists in 
the acquisition ofsuch things as are according 
to Nature. [TD,143-144] 
and 
Every creature of whatsoever nature loves 
itself, or any part of itself, or the use of that 
part, or any of the things, which are according 
to nature, and its slate and frame. [TD, 144] 
Gassendi argues at some length that human beings, 
indeed all animals, have a natural and fundamental 
desire for self-preservation and a natural fear of death. 
In this context, Gassendi objects to the Stoic view that 
death, and therefore suicide, is no evil. The fact that, 
as a fundamental inclination governing all other actions, 
"Nature furnishes all sorts of animals with a natural 
love of life" [TD, 29] and a natural aversion to death 
provides evidence that preservation of one's life is a 
fundamental moral requirement Hence, from Gassendi's 
viewpoint, the defense or preservation ofone's life would 
justify a needed violation of moral requirements of 
sobriety, which are concerned with promoting one's own 
well-being. That is, that minimal diet which is necessary 
is, under normal circumstances a subclass of the natural, 
but, conditions may occur where that which is necessary 
for survival, the fundamental consideration, departs 
from what is natural. That which is requisite for 
preservation of one's life outweighs what is natural and 
necessary for well-being, so, though the human 
inhabitants of Isla may suffer discomforts and even risk 
illness by eating flesh, this is preferable to starvation. 
It might be argued that Gassendi's providentialism 
is questionable, and, without this presupposition, his 
arguments provide us, at best, with self-interested health 
reasons for vegetarianism, but not moral reasons. One 
therefore might object that even if we were to grant 
that all flesh is detrimental to human health, itself a 
questionable assumption, vegetarianism would at best 
be a matter of prudence, not a moral requirement To 
examine the force of this objection to Gassendi's 
account, we tum, in the following section, to Gassendi's 
discussion of our moral obligations to others. 
II 
Moral obligations to others are the fundamental 
consideration in Gassendi's discussion of the virtue of 
justice. Gassendi attributes to Epicurus the view that 
obligations of justice rest upon a mutual contract and 
so exclude relations between humans and animals. 
From this Epicurean viewpoint: 
[T]here is no kind of right and injury, of just 
or unjustbetween the rest ofanimals, because 
it was not possible to make any agreement 
between them, that they should do no mischief 
to one another: So there ought not to be 
between nations which could not or would not 
make any such compact, to do no wrong one 
to another. [TD,319] 
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Gassendi also discusses moral obligations to others 
that fall under considerations of temperance. In 
discussing temperance, which encompasses virtues 
related to the proper regulation of desires, Gassendi 
considers actions which arise from the experience of 
other-interested affections. For example, he claims: 
It is human and natural to be afflicted with 
those that suffer. [TD,300] 
Gassendi notes: 
[It is] strange to consider how great an 
affection we have for those whom we read of 
in history to have shown themselves very kind 
and merciful, and how we abominate those 
who have been barbarous and cruel. [ID,298] 
The pleasure and pain of our natural affections, e.g., 
"the grief or concern that we have for another's 
calamity," [ID, 299] guides us towards the virtues of 
mercy, gentleness, and clemency. Divine providence 
has so arranged human nature that, for us, there are pure 
pleasures, which are never accompanied by pain, and 
stable pleasures, which as natural and necessary produce 
no pain or misery. Pure pleasures and stable pleasures 
are easy to obtain and never require causing pain to 
others. But, for Gassendi, are animals included among 
these others towards whom our action is guided by a 
natural empathy? Itwould seem so, since, in explaining 
the Epicurean view ofour moral obligations to animals, 
he likens our relation to nonhuman animals to our 
relation to humans outside of our society and its laws. 
We are told: 
You may perhaps here by the by ask why we 
kill those creatures... , which we have no 
reason to fear? I confess we may do this 
sometimes through intemperance and cruelty, 
as by inhumanity and barbarity we often 
abuse such sometimes who are out of our 
society, and of whom 'tis not possible that 
we should apprehend any danger of evil. 
[TD,321] 
Killing of animals that is not in self-defense is charac-
terized as an offence "against temperance, or...[against] 
its species, viz., such as sobriety, gentleness, or humanity 
and a natural goodness." [TO, 321] 
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Further, we are told that it is: 
Incident to a weak, cowardly and savage 
nature, to show cruelty to those who are 
overcome, nay, though they have given no 
particular provocation... [ID, 297] 
and 
Reason forbids us to be cruel against the inno-
cent, who never did us any harm... [ID, 30] 
Gratuitous cruelty to innocents, including animals, as 
other wrongs of intemperance, is neither natural nor 
necessary. It is unnatural because it violates the empathy 
or shared pain that is naturally raised in us by the 
apprehension ofpain experienced by others. According 
to Gassendi, divine providence guarantees that nothing 
unnatural is necessary, and, consistently with this, he 
maintains that killing animals is not necessary for 
human well-being. It would seem that, for Gassendi, 
the killing of an animal as of another human being is 
justif18ble only as an act of self-defense. 
He further explains of all sentient beings: 
Nature has made us all related and a kin, by 
bringing us forth from the same principles and 
of the same elements. 'Tis Nature hath given 
us a mutual affection and love, and for the 
same ends. 'Tis Nature hath established what 
is right, just and equitable to its Law. 'TIs a 
greater evil to be the cause of wrong than to 
suffer it Nature commands that our hands 
should be always ready to afford assistance. 
[ID, 370-371] 
Human beings become conscious ofa natural bond with 
other creatures who are capable of suffering pain by 
the regularexperience ofcompassion or empathy, which 
is raised naturally in apprehending the suffering of 
innocent sentient beings. The pain or suffering ofother 
sentient beings naturally raises in us the "griefor 
concern that we have for another's calamity" [ID, 299], 
and with this, the reasoned condemnation of gratuitous 
cruelty. We come to view all sentient beings as a single 
community. From this viewpoint, to do well, we ought 
to treat all who are capable of suffering pain in 
accordance with the following revised principle of 
least pain: "Living well" consists in doing that which 
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will be most effective in minimizing physical or mental 
pain in oneself and in others. 
We might draw from this an implicit endorsement of 
a moral sense theory in which sympathy, or the pain 
naturally experienced in apprehending the suffering of 
others, leads moral agents to apprehend that causing pain 
in any sentient being is wrong. Animals, as capable of 
suffering pain, would be, from this viewpoint, regarded 
as moral subjects, to be treated in accordance with the 
principle of least pain. Once again we confront 
Gassendi's providentialism. God has so designed us 
that we naturally experience sympathy with the pain 
of sentient creatures. This natural experience guides us 
to refrain from cruelty towards all sentient creatures. 
However, it might be claimed that this does not 
provide grounds for vegetarianism. That is, ifan animal, 
or even a human being, is treated well and killed 
painlessly, why is it morally wrong to eat that creature? 
We have not caused any pain to an individual capable 
of suffering pain. 
We might respond that Gassendi's view that 
empathetic perception of others is natural led him to 
regard the use ofanimals as food as unacceptable. That 
is, though, from Gassendi's viewpoint, human beings 
are presently misled by the acquired custom of using 
animals as food, the sympathy experienced in relation 
to sentient beings can be said to naturally motivate moral 
agents, not misled by custom, to refrain from using 
animals as food. 
Further, we can argue that this account does provide 
some basis for vegetarianism. Indeed, ifa painless death 
cannot be assured, and if we accept the principle of 
least pain applied to the community of all individuals 
capable of suffering pain, along with the recognition 
that eating flesh is not necessary for human self-
preservation, then, it would appear, that doing well under 
these conditions would involve not eating flesh. 
Finally, the killing of animals is explicitly 
considered: 
You may perhaps here by the by ask why we 
kill those creatures... , which we have no 
reason to fear? [TO,321] 
The killing of an innocent being that loves its life and 
desires its own survival is regarded as gratuitous cruelty. 
As indicated in the previous section, it is Gassendi's 
view that all sentient beings love life and have a natural 
desire for their own survival. He says: 
Between the Species 
Every creature of whatsoever nature loves 
itself, or any part of itself, or the use of that 
part, or any of the things, which are according 
to nature, and its state and frame. [TO,144] 
There is a moral requirement that moral agents act to 
support their own natural desire for self-preservation. 
Therefore Gassendi would maintain of moral agents 
that It is never wrong to defend one's life by legal 
means where possible or by the most human means 
available, where legal means have no force. 
This position is consistent with the presumption of a 
moral requirement that moral agents respect the natural 
desire that other creatures have for their own self-
preservation. From this viewpoint all killing that is 
avoidable, i.e., that is not necessary for the defense of 
one's life, would be morally wrong. The eating of flesh 
is not necessary for human well-being and so is not 
required for the defense of human life. Therefore, the 
killing of animals for food would be morally wrong. 
Vegetarianism would be required not solely on the 
prudential grounds that it is better for human health. It 
would be required for human beings because it is wrong 
for a moral agent to kill an innocent being that loves its 
own life. Itcan beargued that such action is, inGassendi's 
terms, cruel, barbarous, inhumane, and therefore immoral 
as a violation of the virtue of temperance. 
Still, if I gratuitously damage my fme crystal pitcher 
by smashing it with a hammer, this can be called 
intemperate, as a failure of proper self-control, but not 
thereby immoral. Acts of intemperance are character 
failings, violations of requirements of self-control. 
While an intemperate act may be seen as a failure to 
fulfill a moral requirement, it does not constitute a 
failure to fulfIll a moral obligation in the strong sense. 
Moral wrong-doing in the strong sense, is, in Gassendi's 
terms, injustice. In what follows I will consider support 
for vegetarianism from a Gassendist viewpoint, not on 
grounds of temperance, as argued above, but rather on 
grounds of justice. 
Gassendi rejects the analyses of animal cognition 
provided by his Cartesian and Aristotelian contem-
poraries. ll His analysis, to which we now turn, further 
supports the view that animals are moral subjects.12 
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III 
From Gassendi's viewpoint, animals are not moral 
agents. Only human beings have moral obligations 
because only human beings have the reflective 
capacities that are essential to understanding moral 
principles. But, I wish to claim, Gassendi's account is 
consistent with the view that animals are moral subjects, 
whose natural desire for life ought to be respected by 
moral agents. 
Gassendi's chief adversaries, Cartesians and 
Aristotelians,13 rejected the view that animals are moral 
subjects. Cartesians maintained that animals have no 
moral statuS.14 Aristotelians, who viewed animals as 
property under the dominion of humans, objected to 
needless physical abuse of these sensitive creatures on 
grounds of benevolence but saw no problem with the 
humane killing of animals for human use. Gassendi's 
departure from these adversaries in his analysis of the 
nature of animals supports a different view of our 
obligations to animals.· In this final section, I will 
consider this departure. 
Gassendi explicitly objects to Descartes' view that 
animals cannot think,15 In the Discourse. Descartes 
presents the view that animals have no conscious 
awareness: 16 
This will not seem at all strange to those who 
know how many kinds of automatons, or 
moving machines, the skill of man can 
construct with the use of very few parts, in 
comparison with the great multitude ofbones, 
muscles, nerves, arteries, veins and all the 
other parts that are in the body of any animal. 
For they will regard this body as a machine 
which, having been made by the hands of 
God, is incomparably better ordered than any 
machine that can be devised by man, and 
contains in itself movements more wonderful 
than those in any such machine. [AT, VI. 
55-56; C, 1.139] 
Descartes argues, in support of this view: 
.. .if any such machine has the organs and 
outward shape of a monkey or of some other 
animal that lacks reason, we should have no 
means of knowing that they did not possess 
entirely the same nature as these animals; 
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whereas if any such machines bore a 
resemblance to our bodies or imitated our 
actions as closely as possible for all practical 
purposes, we should still have two very certain 
means of recogniiing that they were not real 
men. The frrst is that they could never use 
words, or put together other signs, as we do in 
order to declare our thoughts to others.... 
Secondly,... they [act] ...not through under-
standing, but only from the disposition of their 
organs... .it is for all practical purposes impos-
sible for a machine to have enough different 
organs to make it act in all the contingencies 
of life in the way in which our reason makes 
us act. [AT, VI, 56-57; C, 1.139-140] 
According to Descartes, animals are seen to be irrational 
because they cannot use speech and they cannot use 
reason to freely choose how they will act. He underlines 
the importance of understanding the great difference 
between the natures of animals and humans because 
failing to perceive this distinction can have moral 
implications: 
...after the error ofthose who deny God...there 
is none that leads weak minds further from the 
straightpath ofvirtue than that ofimagining that 
the souls of the beasts are of the same nature as 
ours, and hence that after this present life we 
have nothing to fear or hope for, any more than 
flies and ants... [AT, VI. 59-60; C, 1.14U 
Gassendi, in his objections to Descartes' Meditations, 
responds to Descartes' arguments. In response to the 
claim that animals cannot speak, Gassendi argues: 
You may say they do not speak. But although 
they do not produce human speech (since of 
course they are not human beings), they still 
produce their own form of speech, which they 
employ just as we do ours. You may say that 
even a delirious man can still string words 
together to express his meaning, which even the 
wisest of the brutes cannot do. But surely you 
are not being fair if you expect the brutes to 
employ human language and are not prepared 
to consider their own kind of language. But to 
go into this would need a much longer 
discussion. [AT, VII, 271; C, 2.189] 
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He says of freedom of choice in acting: 
You may say that you are free and the soul has 
the power of preventing a man from both 
fleeing and advancing. But the principle of 
cognition does just this in the case of an 
animal: a dog, despite his fear of threats and 
blows may rush forward to grab a morsel it 
has seen-and a man often does just the same 
sort of thing! You may say that a dog barks 
simply from impulse, and not, as happens 
when a man speaks, from choice. But in the 
case of man, too, there are causes at work 
which may lead us to judge that he speaks from 
some impulse. What you attribute to choice 
occurs as a result of a stronger impulse, and 
indeed the brute, too, exercises choice, when 
one impulse is greater than another. Indeed, I 
have seen a dog matching his barks to the 
sound of a trumpet, so as to imitate all the 
changes in the notes, whether sharp or flat, or 
slow or fast. And it managed to do this even 
when the tempo of the notes was arbitrarily 
and unexpectedly speeded up, or when the 
notes where unexpectedly drawn out. [AT, VII, 
270; C, 2.188-9] 
He adds, considering the use of reason: 
You may say that brutes lack reason. Well, of 
course they lack human reason, but they do 
not lack their own kind of reason. So it does 
not seem appropriate to call them 'aloga' 
['irrational'] except by comparison with us or 
with our kind ofreason; and in any case 'logos' 
or reason seems to be a general term, whichcan 
be attributed to them no less than the cognitive 
faculty or internal sense. You may say that 
animals do not employ rational argument But 
although they do not reason so perfectly or 
about as many subjects as man, they still reason, 
and the difference seems to be merely one of 
degree. [AT, VII, 270-271; C, 2.189]17 
Gassendi, objecting to Descartes' view of animals, 
maintains that animals have a capacity to think, though 
not all the powers of thought that human beings have. 
He claims that animals cannot reflect on their own 
mental awareness or formulate abstract ideas. 1 g 
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However, animals experience sensations and, with this, 
pleasure and pain; they are capable of imagistic 
reasoning and of exercising will or choice. Hence, 
postulating a fundamental continuity among the whole 
community of animals, Gassendi suggests that the 
difference between the cognitive powers ofhumans and 
other animals is "merely one of degree," not kind. 
In addition, Gassendi objects to the Aristotelian 
analysis of animal cognition, presented in his time, for 
example, by Suarez. Suarez argues: 
ButAristotle clearly writes in the Politics VII, 
at the end of chapter thirteen, that man alone 
has reason. Whereas in brute animals there is 
no sign, or effect, in which they show the use 
of reason. Hence, they have neither proper 
speech, nor freedom in operating, but are led 
by natural instinct.19 
Suarez, like Gassendi, objects to the view that animals 
experience no sense awareness. Speaking of those who 
"deny sensitivity to them," i.e., to animals, he states: 
"But truly, this opinion is intolerable, and a great 
paradox...." [S, III.500]20 According to Suarez, animals 
experience sensation, but they are incapable of 
reasoning or will. Animal activity is not the ·result of 
choice based upon thought; it is the automatic response 
to a stimulus determined solely by "natural instinct." 
Gassendi explicitly objects to the view that animal 
behavior can be described as the effect of"blind instinct" 
Animal behavior, like human behavior, he claims, 
involves learning from one's experience or from one's 
associates, along with a rudimentary sort of reasoning. 
From the natural experience ofpain, e.g., of hunger, and, 
in tum, of the pleasure involved in relieving such pains, 
associations are formed by the imagination [orphantasy] 
which serve to direct future pursuit and avoidance 
behavior. Gassendi says of instinct: 
It is easy to understand from all this that what 
we call instinct is a certain motion which is not 
blind, but is in fact directed by the phantasy; 
and this, in part, by a simple apprehension of 
good or bad, principally when it is present, and, 
in part, also by reasoning, in so far as one 
judges of the good or bad which should follow 
in the future and of which one has some sort 
of presentiment. This motion, then, is the 
spontaneous use of the parts properly destined 
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to act with regard to this reasoning, as the use 
of the feet to flee, that of the hom, tooth and the 
like to attack. .. [G, 2.415] 
The pursuit and avoidance behavior of animals follows 
from remembering "what has succeeded and what has 
not succeeded in order that they infer that they ought or 
ought not to perform a certain action." [G,2.415] This, 
Gassendi contends, involves not inborn instincts, but 
learning from experience and a rudimentary sort of 
reasoning, i.e., sense reasoning, which requires the use 
of images. Further: 
Instructed not only by their own observations 
but also by teaching and examples, whether 
from their parents or from certain others whose 
actions they have seen and from whom the 
vestiges remain in the phantasy, they reason 
about what they should do. [G, 2.415] 
Gassendi provides empirical evidence to support his 
hypothesis that the pursuit and avoidance behavior of 
animals is based not upon "blind instinct," but rather 
upon imagistic or sense reasoning from what has been 
experienced or from what has been learned from others. 
He cites examples to demonstrate that animals 
experience a desire for their own good and for the good 
of their offspring, and that they exercise imagistic 
reasoning to achieve their ends. Hence, according to 
Gassendi, animals are not to be dismissed as wholly 
irrational, for they act on the basis of a rudimentary 
sort of reasoning and will. 
Therefore, Gassendi argues that the avoidance 
behavior of animals is motivated by fear, raised by 
reasoning from past to future experience, which leads 
to the awareness of a danger to life or limb. He claims 
that "most animals flee us because they have received 
some harm from us" [G, 2.415] and, in support of this 
claim, cites reports that, in wilderness areas ofAmerica, 
animals, which have never been hunted by human 
beings, have no fear of humans. Further, fear of a 
particular kind of creature cannot be instinctive: 
It may even be that the lamb wouldn't flee the 
wolf if it hadn't learned to flee with the others 
and if it hadn't perceived the wolf coming at 
it with its mouth ajar. Moreover, the lamb 
doesn't flee the wolf it knows nor the hare the 
dog with whom it was raised. [G, 2.416] 
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An animal loves its own life and learns, from its own 
experience or from that of others, to fear and to avoid 
those things that are likely to harm it 
It is from this viewpoint that Gassendi says that 
"Nature furnishes all sorts of animals with a natural 
love of life." [TD, 29] Animals think, and they direct 
their own actions in the light ofan interest in protecting 
and preserving their own lives and well-being. In this 
sense, animals as well as human beings have a natural 
desire for self-preservation. 
In his discussion of justice, Gassendi explains that 
one of the "chief offices or general duties of justice 
consist(s) in hurting or doing wrong to nobody," 
[TO, 307] where "hurt" or "harm" is used to designate 
not simply pain but also any loss of something valued, 
for example, of life, of limb, of a loved one, of 
property. He notes that not all action that causes harm 
is moral wrong-doing, as, for example, where harm is 
done by accident or through ignorance. He distin-
guishes between an unjust action, which includes all 
that harms an innocent victim, and an action done 
unjustly, or moral wrong-doing, which Gassendi 
designates by the term injury. 
Injury involves the intent to harm. In addition, injury 
is done against the will of the individual harmed: 
...because it is one thing to suffer an unjust 
act, or to receive a damage, and another to 
suffer an injury, a man may willingly suffer 
an unjust act but not suffer an injury. For that 
reason Aristotle observes that we defme a man 
who does an injury: He who hurts, knowing 
to whom, in what manner, and how he hurts; 
yet that is not sufficient, but we must add this 
particular. Against the will of him whom he 
hurts. [TO,334] 
Gassendi explains that though an individual can cause 
himself damage, he cannot act unjustly or do wrong to 
himself, because he cannot truly injure or be unjust 
towards himself, i.e., he cannot harm himself against 
his own will. Further, "no injury can be done to him 
who consents and approves of it," unless that consent 
is coerced by "some pretence," by "fair promises," 
flattery, or the like. [TO, 335] 
Since moral wrong-doing involves intentionally 
causing harm to another individual against its will, to 
morally wrong another, the victim must be capable of 
exercising will. From Gassendi's viewpoint, a rock 
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or plant can be damaged butcannot be treated unjustly. 
for. since neither can exercise will. no action can be 
taken against the will of either one. But. as discussed 
above. according to Gassendi. all animals do exercise 
will. All desire to avoid harm and they act to preserve 
their own lives and well-being. The will of an animal 
intentionally directed to this end can be thwarted. As 
such. an animal can be the victim of injustice or moral 
wrong-doing.21 
Finally. we might note that Gassendi postulates 
that harm to others is a wrong-doing of justice. 
because justice "consists in rendering to everyone 
that which belongs to him." [TO. 306] He contends 
that it is a requirement ofjustice that each individual 
be given control over and free use of that which 
belongs to him without constraint or interference. 
Such interference. when it is intentional and against 
the will of the recipient. is an injury and is unjust. 
Gassendi explains: 
This has given occasion to the lawyers to 
define justice. A constant and perpetual will 
or resolution to give or restore to everyone 
his right; that is to say. that which justly 
belongs to him. [TD. 307] 
He adds "these words comprehend the function and the 
proper act ofjustice": "To render to everyone his right." 
rro.308] 
A right from this viewpoint is a power to exercise 
one's will that ought to be recognized and respected. 
Gassendi equates "what belongs to everyone as his 
right" with "what authority. power. and command 
everyone has over anything." rro. 311] Intentional 
infringement upon or limitation of such authority or 
power. without sufficient reason. is the sort of harm 
that is characterized by Gassendi as an injury or moral 
wrong-doing. Gassendi refers to one's jurisdiction over 
that which belongs to one by nature. including life and 
"the natural faculties of sensation. of imagination. of 
appetite. of self-motion. of preserving and nourishing 
oneself...... [TO. 2.798] as animal rights. He distin-
guishes these animal rights from another sort of rights. 
e.g.• to property. which are distinctly human rights 
because the acquiring of this sort ofauthority or power 
requires a contractual agreement. This suggests that 
Gassendi may have departed from the Epicurean view 
that animals have no rights. maintaining instead that 
animals have rights to the unhampered use and control 
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of those things that naturally belong to them. That is. it 
is morally wrong to infringe upon the power or 
command over those things that naturally belong to any 
individual. including animals. without sufficient reason. 
This line of reasoning further supports vegetarianism. 
for. from this viewpoint, it would be morally wrong in 
the strong sense. i.e.• on grounds of justice. to infringe 
upon any individual's right to life. including animals. 
unless this can be justified as an act of self-defense. 
As stated above. for Gassendi. nothing immoral is 
natural to human beings. And consistent with 
Gassendi's claims. one might conclude, whether on 
grounds of temperance or justice: it is because killing 
creatures that love their own lives is morally wrong 
that God has so designed human beings that eating flesh 
is unnatural to them. From this viewpoint, vegetar-
ianism would be a moral requirement. one which divine 
providence.by ournatural empathy. ournatural structure 
and our natural pains. guides us to note. 
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1 I gratefully acknowledge that research for this paper 
was partially funded by a grant from the Research Founda-
tion of the City University of New York. All translations 
are my own unless otherwise noted. I have modernized 
spelling and grammar in quotations from seventeenth-
century English texts. 
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respect to the development of his own moral theory as early 
as 1624 [Exercitationum Paradoxicarum Adversus 
Aristoteleos..., Book I (Grenoble. 1624). preface]. Some 
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(New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation. 1972). 
3 Gassendi's Epicurean Synragma was fIrst published as 
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subsequently published separately (The Hague, 1659), then 
together with Gassendi's lnstitutio Logica (London, 1660 and 
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ofPhilosophy (London: Moseley and Dring. 1655-61). vol. 3, 
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de Gassendi (The Hague: Martimis Nijhoff. 1971), 
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Epicurean moral theory, see, for example, E. & F. Michael, 
"A Note on Gassendi in England," Notes and Queries 
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Scientific Knowledge," Journal ofthe History ofldeas (1983), 
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8 For another seventeenth-century English translation of 
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Synragma, see Walter Charleton, Epicurus's Morals (London, 
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9 Gassendi dermed moral philosophy as "the art of acting 
well and from virtue." [G. 2.659] 
10 See Gassendi's Epistolae in his Opera Omnia, vol. 6, 
p.20. 
11 An indication of the seventeenth-century concern with 
and controversy over animal cognition is clear from the 
following selection of seventeenth-century works: Chanet, 
Pierre, De I'instinct et de la connoissance des animaux avec 
I'examen de ce que M. de La Chambre a escrit sur cette 
matiere. La Rochelle, 1646; Cyprian, Johann, Sensus et 
cognito in brutis adversus Antonium Le Grand, 1676; 
Dannanson, Jean M., La Beste transformee en machine.. .que 
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Discourse... (London: Pitt, 1670)]; De La Chambre, Louis, 
"De la connoissance des betes," Les Caracteres des 
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animarum in brutis (Frankfurt, 1638); Willis Thomas, Two 
Discourses Concerning the Souls ofBrutes... (London, 1672). 
12 Gassendi's distinctive analysis is frequently overlooked 
by contemporary commentators. See, for example, the 
contrast of Descartes' modem view of animals as automata 
with the view of the seventeenth-untury Peripatetics by R. 
M. YOlmg ["Animal Soul," Encyclopedia ofPhiWsophy (New 
York: Macmillan, 1967), vol. I, pp. 122-127]: "Descartes's 
most formidable opponents in the seventeenth-untury were 
the Peripatetics...." The Gassendist view, a view similar in 
many respects to the view later adopted by Locke, is attributed 
to Locke. Ball., in his interesting discussion in "Cartesian 
Doctrine and the Animal Soul" [Cartesian Studies (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1951), pp. 106-157] similarly 
speaks of the early seventeenth century opponents of 
automatism as "being in the main Scholastics" [po 110]; 
Gassendi's arguments against automatism are not discussed. 
The view that Descartes' view of mind, body and animals 
was the modem view is presupposed in such articles as: 1. 
Jaynes, "The Problem ofAnimate Motion in the Seventeenth 
Century," Journal of the History of Ideas (1970), vol. 31, 
pp. 219-234; E. S. Reed, "Descartes' Corporeal Ideas 
Hypothesis and the Origin ofScientific Psychology," Review 
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[From Beast-Machine to Man-Machine (New York: Octagon 
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13 We find in theses written for student disputations by 
professors ofthe graduating class in the Scottish Universities, 
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concerns and influences in seventeenth-century philosophy. 
From the middle of the seventeenth century. these provide 
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Aristotelians, the Cartesians and the Epicureans. These three 
views have, as chief proponents, Suarez, Descartes and, 
popularizer of Epicurean views, Gassendi. 
14Though Descartes himself was never accused of 
mistreating animals, many of his followers were associated 
with callousness and cruelty towards animals by their 
contemporaries. Fontaine, speaking of Descartes' followers 
at Arnauld's Port-Royale-des-Champs, derides the attitude of 
Cartesians towards animals: 
'They administered beatings to dogs with perfect 
indifference, and made fun of those who pitied the 
creatures as if they had felt pain. They said that the 
animals were clocks; that the cries they emitted when 
struck were only the noise of a little spring which 
had been touched, but that the whole body was 
without feeling. They nailed poor animals up on 
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the circulationofthe blood which was a great subject 
ofconversation." [N. Fontaine, Memoirespour servir 
a I'histoire de Port-Royal (1738), vol. 2, pp. 52-3; 
translation by L. C. Rosenfield, op. cit., p. 54.] 
IS For Descartes' presentation of his view of animals as 
automata, see, for example, Descartes' discussion in his 
Discourse on Method [C. Adams & P. Tannery, eds., Oevres 
de Descartes (paris: 1897-1913), vol. 7, pp. 55-57; henceforth 
noted as AT; 1. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch, 
translators, The Philosophical Writings ofDescartes (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), vol. I, pp. 139-140; 
henceforth noted as C.]. 
16 For Descartes, the complete distinctness of mind and 
body, as a thinking and an extended substance respectively, 
implies that animals, as extended substances, haveno conscious 
awareness. Descartes explicitly states that this means that 
animals experience neither pleasure nor pain. See, for example, 
his response to Merseene, AT, m. 85,letter 192, June, 1640. 
17 See also, other arguments presented in support of 
his view of animal cognition in Gassendi's objections to 
Meditation n. 
18 For further discussion ofGassendi 's arguments, see E. 
& F. Michael, "Two Early Modern Concepts of Mind: 
Reflecting Substance vs. Thinking Substance,"Journal ofthe 
History ofPhilosophy (1989), vol. 27, pp. 29-47. 
19 R. P. Francisci Suarez, Opera Omnia, De Anima, (L. 
Vives: Paris, 1856ff.), vol. 3, p. 500; henceforth noted as 
S. Suarez, an influential representative of Thomistic 
Aristote1ianism, discusses animal cognition in his De Anima, 
which·was published posthumously in 1620. 
20 Suarez does not identify any proponents of this 
position. The view that animals function as automata was 
held before Descartes by, for example, the Spanish physician, 
Gomez Pereira [Antoniana-Margarita, Medina del Campo, 
1554]. For disCussion of Pereira, see, for example: N. A. 
Cortes, "Gomez Pereira y Luis de Mercado datos para su 
biografia," Revue Hispanique (1914), vol. 31, pp. 2-29; E. 
Bullon y Fernandez, Les Precursores espanoles de Bacon y 
Descartes (Salamanca, 1905). 
21 This Gassendist position is at variance with the 
thoroughgoing contractarian account of justice which 
Gassendi attributes to Epicurus. There is no evidence that 
Gassendi himself held the view that animals are members 
of a moral community, or that he recognized moral patients 
that are not moral subjects, but these assumptions are con-
sistent with a Gassendist analysis of justice. 
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